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STATEMENT OF THE 
A. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant 1 Appellant / Cross-Respondent, Kevin D. Smith, hereinafter "Kevin," 
previously set forth his Nature of the Case in his Appellant's Brief and need not restate 
the sane here. 
B. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE MAGISTRATE COURT 
Kevin previously set forth his Course of Proceedings in the Magistrate Court in 
his Appellant's Brief and need not restate the same here. 
C. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
Kevin previously set forth his Course of Proceedings in the District Court in his 
Appellant's Brief and need not restate the same here. 
D. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Kevin's Statement of Facts was previously set forth in his Appellant's Brief and 
need not restate the same here. 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
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In this action, Kevin and Plaintiff/ Responde~~t 1 Cross-Appellant, Debra A. 
Borley, hereinafter "Debra," entered into two (2) agreements. The first agreement was 
the Property Settlement Agreement entered into on September 16,2005. (R. pp. 19 - 
29). Paragraph 10 of the Property Settlement Agreement states: 
10. AGREEMENT TO BE MERGED: The parties hereto agree that 
in the event a divorce is entered, the original of this Agreement will be 
submitted to the court for approval and the parties hereto will request 
that this Agreement will be merged and incorporated and made a part of 
the Judgment and Decree of Divorce. 
R. p. 24. The second agreement entered into by Kevin and Debra was the Stipulation 
that the Judgment and Decree of Divorce filed on September 22,2005 be entered by the 
Court. (R. pp. 19 - 20). The specific language regarding merger in the Judgment and 
Decree of Divorce states: 
2. PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT: The Property 
Settlement Agreement dated September 15,2005 is approved by this 
court. The Properm Settlement Ameement is approved by this Court. 
. - - . . 
bur it is not merged nor incorporated into this Jucigillent and Decree of 
1)ivorce. ,\ copy of that Agreement is anachcd hereto. 'The panies have 
provided all ofthe terms of the said Agreement. (Emphasis added). 
(R. pp. 19 - 20). 
In Tovama v. Tovarna, 1129 Idaho 142,922 P.2d 1068 (1996), the Idaho 
Supreme Court held: 
As this Court has previously held, the rules of construction of 
contracts apply equally to the interpretation of divorce decrees. 
DeLancey v. DeLancey, 110 Idaho 63,65,714 P.2d 32,34 (1986). If the 
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language in the decree is clear an unambiguous, determination of the its 
meaning and legal effect is a question of law upon which this Court 
exercises free review. Id. 
129 Idaho at 144. The Judgment and Decree of Divorce filed in this action on 
September 22,2005 is clear and unambiguous that the Property Settlement Agreement 
is not merged into the Judgment and Decree of Divorce. 
The magistrate court and the district court erred in this action in ruling the 
Property Settlement Agreement did merge into the Judgment and Decree of Divorce. 
Both the magistrate court and the district court incorrectly attempted to read both 
agreements together, thereby creating an ambiguity. Pursuant to the doctrine of merger, 
it is the last agreement that controls. In Stuart v. D'Ascenz, 22 P.3d 540 
(Col.App.2000), the Colorado Court of Appeals, citing a holding by the Tennessee 
Court of Appeals, held: 
Moreover, the parties' execution of the purchase agreement preceded 
the execution of the lease by five weeks. As such, the purchase 
agreement provisions merged into the unambiguous clause in the lease 
dealing with the same subject matter. See Batterman v. Wells Fargo Ag 
Credit Corp., 802 P.2d 11 12, 11 15 (Colo.App.1990) ("[Ulnder law of 
merger, prior agreements, covenants, and conversations are merged into 
the fmal, fonnal, written contracts executed by the parties."); Davidson 
v. Davidson, 916 S.W.2d 918,922 (TennApp.1995) ("[Tlhe last 
agreement concerning the same subject matter that has been signed by 
all parties supersedes all former agreements, and the last contract is the 
one that embodies the true agreement.") (quoting Magnolia Group v. 
Metropolitan Development & Housing Agency, 783 S.W.2d 563,566 
(Tenn.App. 1989)). 
22 P.3d at 542-543. In Davidson v. Davidson, 916 S.W.2d 918 (Tennessee App. 1995), 
the Tennessee Court of Appeals held: 
Wife furfher asserts that since the QDRO and the MDA are 
agreements respecting the same subject matter, the doctrine of merger 
m. She correctly cites Magnolia Group v. Metropolitan Dev. And 
Hous. Agency, 783 S.W.2d 563,566 (Tenn.App. 1989), for the 
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proposition that "tile last agreement concern in^ the s h e  subiect matter 
that has been s h e d  by all parties supersedes all former ameements, and 
the last contract is the one that embodies the true anreenlent." 
(Emphasis added). 
916 S.W.2d at 922. 
In this action, the last agreement between Kevin and Debra was for the entry of 
a Judgment and Decree of Divorce that specifically stated the Property Settlement 
Agreement did not merge into the Judgment and Decree of Divorce. Because the 
Property Settlement Agreement did not merge into the Judgment and Decree of 
Divorce, the magistrate court had no jurisdiction over Debra's Motion to Divide 
Omitted Asset filed March 24,2006. (Augmented Record, Exhibit "A,"). 
II. 
THE MAGISTRATE COURT AND THE DISTRICT COURT HAD NO 
JURISDICTION TO MODIFY THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE 
PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA. 
Even if the Property Settlement Agreement entered into by Kevin and Debra is 
merged into the Judgment and Decree of Divorce, the magistrate court and the district 
court had no jurisdiction to modify the Judgment and Decree of Divorce. McBride v. 
McBride, 112 Idaho 959, 961,739 P.2d 258 (1987). Debra argues that the magistrate 
court had jurisdiction to grant Debra's Motion to Divide Omitted Asset. Debra's 
argument is correct, but only if there is an omitted asset. The magistrate court 
determined the converfible notes were not an omitted asset as the convertible notes 
were covered by paragraph 4 of the Property Settlement Agreement. Once this 
determination was made, the Court had no jurisdiction to further divide the convertible 
notes. Pursuant to paragraph 4 of the Property Settlement Agreement, Debra is entitled 
to 50% of the convertible notes that were accumulated during the parties' maniage. 
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None of the convertible notes were acquired until after Kevin and Debra divorced and 
therefore, the convertible notes are Kevin's separate property. 
The district court ruled that the magistrate court had jurisdiction to enforce the 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce and divide the convertible notes. Debra did bring 
a motion to enforce the Judgment and Decree of Divorce. As such, the enforcement of 
the Judgment and Decree of Divorce was not raised before the magistrate court and 
therefore, is not an issue on appeal. 
In Borah v. McCandless, 147 Idaho 73,205 P.3d 1209 (2009), the Idaho 
Supreme Court held: 
Generally, appellate review is limited to those issues raised in the 
lower court and this Court will not decide issues presented for the first 
time on apueal. Barbee v. WM4 Securities, Inc., 143 Idaho 391,397, 
146 P.3d 657,663 (2006) (citing Balser v. Kootenai County Bd Of 
Comrs., 110 Idaho 37,40,714 P.2d 6,9 (1986)). (Emphasis added). 
205 P.3d at 1214. The district court erred in raising this issue sua sponte on appeal. 
Debra made no attempt in her Motion to Divide Omitted Asset to raise an issue as to 
enforcement of the Judgment and Decree of Divorce. Clearly, both the magistrate court 
and the district court concluded the convertible notes were controlled by paragraph 4 of 
the Property Settlement Agreement. Therefore, the convertible notes were not an 
omitted asset and the magistrate court had no jurisdiction to re-divide thein. 
111. 
DEBRA'S ARGUMENT THAT THE CONVERTIBLE NOTES AND THE STOCK 
ALLOCATION AR.E COMMUNITY PROPERTY HAS NO MERIT. 
Debra argues that the convertible notes and stock allocation received by Kevin 
are community property. Debra further argues: 
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These undivided assets need to be divided pursuant to paragraph 4 of 
the Property Settlement Agreement, or divided as "omitted assets" 
pursuant to Debra's earlier motion. 
Respondent's 1 Cross-Appellant's Brief, p. 26. Both the magistrate court and the 
district court ruled the convertible notes were controlled by paragraph 4 of the Property 
Settlement Agreement which divided the marital portion, if any, on a 50 - 50 basis. As 
such, the convertible notes were not an omitted asset. Further, the convertible notes 
were accumulated and acquired after the parties' divorce was filed on September 22, 
2005. The parties stipulated to the following facts regarding the convertible notes: 
16. In order for a pilot to receive convertible note distributions I 
allocations, said pilot must have been employed on February 1, 
2006 and have been a qualified member of the A plan as of 
-9 
December 30,2004. 
17. In determining a pilot's share of the convertible note allocations i 
distributions, United took into account each pilot's age, years left 
to retirement (which is reached at age 50) and seniority. United 
projected that the more seniority a pilot had, the greater the 
projection as to the aircraft that heishe would be flying at 
retirement. A pilot projected to be flying a 777 at the time of 
retirement versus a pilot that would be flying an A320 would be 
entitled to a greater allocation of convertible notes assuming that 
the pilots were of the same age. The one with greater seniority 
would be projected to be flying a more advanced aircraft with 
higher pay. 
(Augmented Record, Exhibit J, pp. 6 - 7). Clearly, the convertible notes did not accrue 
until February 1,2006. Black's Law dictionary 10 (5" ed. 1983) defines "accrue" in 
part as follows: 
Accrue lahiwl. To increase or accumulate; due and payable; vested. 
Debra agreed in the Property Settlement Agreement to divide Kevin's United Airlines 
Retirement on an accrued benefit basis, not a time rule basis. As such, any retirement 
benefits that accrue after the parties' divorce are Kevin's separate property. Debra 
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seeks to keep her 50% share of Kevin's United Airlines retirement accrued during the 
marriage and also receive a portion of Kevin's retirement that accrued after marriage. 
This would clearly be inequitable and contrary to Idaho law. Hypothetically, if the 
"time rule" method had been used as the method to divide Kevin's United Airlines 
retirement, then Debra would be entitled to a portion of the convertible notes, however, 
her share of the United Airlines retirement that is now with the Pension Benefit 
Guarantee Association would be far less than 50%. Debra does not get the best of both 
retirement division methods used in the state of Idaho. It is also important to note that 
Kevin's share of the convertible notes were based on Kevin's age on February 1,2006 
until his retirement at age 60. The convertible notes were to compensate Kevin for a 
portion of the A-Plan he was losing from February 1,2006 until retirement if the A- 
Plan had stayed in place. 
With regard to the stock allocation, the magistrate court correctly ruled that the 
stock allocation was Kevin's separate property. First, in order to receive the stock 
allocation, Kevin had to be employed by United Airlines on February 1, 2006. Second, 
as the magistrate court correctly noted, that the stock allocation was divided pursuant to 
paragraph 13 of the Property Settlement Agreement. (R. pp. 39 - 41). 
IV. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THE 
STOCK ALLOCATION WAS AN OMITTED ASSET. 
Even if a portion of the stock allocation was earned during the parties' marriage, 
it was awarded to Kevin in paragraph 13 of the Property Settlement Agreement (R. pp. 
24 - 25) as his share of the assets. The stock allocation is clearly property or income 
acquired by Kevin after the date the Property Settlement Agreement was entered into 
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by Kevin and is therefore, his separate property. The district court's holding that any 
portion of the stock allocation that related to the period of May 1, 2003 to the date of 
divorce is clearly community property is irrelevant as paragraph 13 of the Property 
Settlement Agreement awarded that share of the community property to Kevin as his 
separate property. (R. pp. 64 - 65, pp. 24 - 25). The district court's citation of Batra v. 
m, 135 Idaho 388, 17 P.3d 889 (2001) is misplaced. First, m a  is specific to stock 
options. The stock allocation Kevin received was not a stock option. Second, 
paragraph 13 of the Property Settlement Agreement clearly awarded the stock 
allocatiolls to Kevin. 
v. 
DEBRA IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Debra cites paragraph 15.03 of the Property Settlement Agreement in support of 
her claim that she is entitled to attorney's fees and costs she has incurred in bringing this 
action. Debra's argument is misplaced. Paragraph 15.03 of the Property Settlement 
Agreement provides: 
15.03 If an action is instituted to enforce any of the terms of this 
Agreement, then the losing party agrees to pay to the prevailing party all 
costs and attorneys' fees incurred in that action. (Emphasis added). 
(R. p. 25). Even if Debra prevailed, she is not entitled to attorney's fees and costs 
because her Motion to Divide Omitted Assets does not seek to enforce the Property 
Settlement Agreement. In fact, Debra seeks to change the terms of the Property 
Settlement Agreement by arguing the convertible notes and the stock allocation were not 
included in the Property Settlement Agreement. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should reverse both the magistrate court and the district court 
on the merger issue pursuant to the doctrine of merger as the Property Settlement 
Agreement did not merge into the Judgment and Decree of Divorce. Therefore, the 
magistrate court had no jurisdiction over Debra's Motion to Divide Omitted Assets. 
Further, the Supreme Court should reverse the magistrate court's decision awarding a 
portion of the convertible notes to Debra as those convertible notes are Kevin's separate 
property. With regard to the stock allocation, the Supreme Court should affirm the 
magistrate court's ruling that the stock allocation is Kevin's separate property and reverse 
the district court's ruling that a portion of the stoclc allocation is community property. 
Finally, Kevin should be awarded attorney's fees and costs on appeal and below. 
Attorney for Defendant 1 Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, certify that on the pday of June, 2009, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF to be forwarded with all 
required charges prepaid, by the method(s) indicated below, in accordance with the Rules 
of Civil Procedure, to the following person@) 
Matthew R. Bohn 
COSHO HUMPHREY, LLP 
P.O. Box 9518 
Boise, ID 83707-951 8 
Hand Deliver 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile 
Overnight Mail 
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